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I
In the preceding chapter, Nihilism and Sunyata, I discussed the notion of sub­
stance. Ordinarily, it is substance that is thought to make a thing exist as itself. 
“Substance” is used to indicate the essence of the thing, the self-identity 
whereby the thing is as this very thing; in other words, the being of a being. 
All beings possess “attributes” and “accidentia” various qualities, size, shape, 
etc.; but what constitutes their basis and unity has been called substance.
To speak more concretely, the term “substance” expresses what a thing is, 
what kind of thing it is. Supposing, for example, that a certain reality is a human 
being, then “substance” would denote the “beingness” of this reality in its 
mode of being man.
It is generally believed that this substance cannot be perceived by the senses 
but that, as the being-itself at the back of the various sensory appearances, it 
can only be grasped through thinking. As such, the concept of “substance” 
has been the central moment of all ontology up to now.
However, the question remains as to whether that which makes something 
be something—where it “is” as itself—in short, whether its “selfness” is 
really grasped, is truly expressed by the concept of substance.
Indeed, the concept of substance brings to the surface the in-itself mode of 
being of the “thing” itself. However, this is forever the selfness of the thing 
as it appears to us on the field of reason (reason taken in a broad sense).
* “The Standpoint of £unyata” is a translation of “ATi w tacbiba” the fourth chapter 
of the author’s Sbikyd to wa namka (“What is Religion?”). The second half of this chapter 
will appear in the next issue of the Eastern Btddbist.
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The function of thinking, as an operation of reason in us, is to open up a field 
beyond the field of sense perception where “things” are made to reveal their 
selfness. Therein lies the proper significance of thinking.
But just for that reason the “substance” grasped on this field of reason, can 
never be anything but the in-itself mode of being of the thing as it appears 
to us; thus, insofar as it is seen by us. It is hard to maintain that this 
shows directly the thing in a mode of being whereby it is truly on its own 
home-ground. The original itself-ness of the “thing” must lie beyond the 
reach of reason and be impervious to thinking.
However, this does not mean that a thing, like the “reality of the object” 
in the sense of the traditional realisms or materialisms (reality as materiality), 
reveals the original itself-ness of the thing. Such reality as that which, within 
the thing as it appears on the field of the senses, transcends direct perception— 
such reality is represented as something on the yonder side of the perceiving 
subject. However, it is represented as such from the standpoint of the opposi­
tion of subject and object; from the standpoint of the object and its representa­
tion. It is thus only the beyond of the opposition of subject and object as it is 
seen from the side of the object.
It pretends to be beyond the opposition of subject and object but is, in fact, 
still seen within the perspective of one of the opposing directions. Insofar, it 
cannot escape the objection of still being thought from the standpoint of the 
opposition of subject and object. In general, no matter how definitely one 
conceives of a reality within things beyond our consciousness and representa­
tion—as long as these things are envisaged as “things” in the ordinary sense, 
namely, looked on objectively as objects, their objective reality does not 
avoid the contradiction of being represented as a reality beyond representation.
Herein, the mode of being which is said to escape the relation with the sub­
ject, still, when looked at from its hidden side, only exists by containing a tacit 
relation to the subject; and it does not, after all, avoid being a mode of being 
manifesting itself in our direction. This is precisely the state of affairs which 
I called above “the paradox of representation.”
Again, one might think that we can only come in touch with the reality of 
things in our action or praxis, and that therein the standpoint of representation 
is already transcended. But, in this case also, the problem remains: in what 
field does this ability to come into immediate contact with the reality of things 
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in our praxis (individual or social) obtain; in what kind of field is such an action 
fundamentally possible?
It is related that on hearing Berkeley’s theory that for things “to be” means 
“to be perceived,” Dr Johnson tried to show how absurd this doctrine was by 
kicking a pebble. However, no matter how much truth there lies in this coun­
ter-evidence-in-action, this alone does not constitute a real proof to the con­
trary, because it remains problematic on what kind of field Dr Johnson’s action 
arose. For example, did it arise on the field of mere sense perception, the like 
of which is also found in animals; or on the field of the mode of being of man 
with his clear consciousness and intellect; or again, on a field transcending con­
sciousness and intellect?
Supposing for a moment that it falls in the first category, the action cannot 
be said to touch the “be” of things or their reality. In comparison, the theory 
which, in regard to the pebble or the foot or the act of kicking itself, asserts 
that their “being” is “being perceived,” can be considered to be a standpoint 
entering deeper into the inner reality of things.
But, of course, this standpoint itself belongs to the second category men­
tioned above, and is nothing else than the convergence of the field of the op­
position of subject and object in the direction of the subject. If, on the contrary, 
the field where activity originates would be thought of as the area of the reality 
(wz. materiality) of things as objects (the supposition I considered above), this 
would amount to converging the field of the opposition of subject and object 
in the direction of the object; and, unavoidably, a hidden relationship to the 
subject would already be implied.
This means that materialism, as well as idealism, fails to open up a field where, 
in a praxis, immediate contact with the reality itself of things would be possible. 
Both materialism and idealism lose sight of the basic field where the reality of 
things and human praxis come into being; they lose sight of the field where 
“things” come into their own and reveal their reality as it is, and where our 
every slightest action finds its origin.
This is the field which transcends consciousness and intellect—the third 
possibility I mentioned above. It is bound to be, in the sense I shall explain 
later on, the “field of emptiness.” This appears as the field of a wisdom which 
could be called the “knowing of unknowing.” Looking back from that 
standpoint, conscious knowledge (or intellectual cognition) also is, in the final
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analysis, no other than “knowing of unknowing” Qnuchi no chi
Similarly, this is the field of a praxis which should be called “action of non­
action” (musa no m Looking back from there, our every behaviour
would be, as it is, nothing but “action of non-action.”
And lastly, this is the field where knowledge and praxis are one, and the 
field where things come into their own and reveal their reality as it is.
However, I shall touch on this subject later. Now I only want it to be under­
stood that the fact in itself of speaking of action or praxis does not solve the 
problem as regards the field on which, fundamentally, this praxis arises; and 
that this problem remains intact even when this praxis is called a social praxis.
As I have said above, the transcendence of the whole field of opposition of 
subject and object—the field of sense perception and equally the field of intel­
lectual thinking—comes about through the fact that at the base of those fields 
nibilum appears and both subject and object are “nihilizcd” from their roots up. 
In the point that both subject and object are an-nihil-ated, the field of mbilum 
differs from the “field of materiality” and the “field of Ideas.”
Materiality is represented as transcending the opposition of subject and 
object in the direction of the “matter” of things, which appears on the field 
of the senses or is, at least, reached through the field of the senses. On the other 
hand, the Idea is represented as transcending rhe opposition of subject and 
object in the direction of the “form” of things, which appears on the field of 
reason, namely in the direction of the “substance.”
These two are identical in that they both are conceived of via the thing as it 
appears as an “object” in the field of opposition of subject and object. Con­
versely, both are conceived of on the basis of the aspect of things under which 
things reveal themselves to us as subjects.
The field of nibilum, on the other hand, appears when such an entanglement of 
subject and object has been thoroughly overcome. In the field of nibilum, all 
that is ordinarily said to exist or to be real, on the fields of the senses and of 
reason, is unmasked as having nibilum at its base, as being from the outset 
without any roots.
The concentration in which every being assembles itself within itself, 
namely its “beingness,” is like being suspended out into an abyss, like vani­
shing into a bottomless pit. From the depths of all things, things come 
floating up under their dispersing, dissolving aspect. No matter how gigantic
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a mountain mass is, how robust a man, how solid a person, all are in the same 
boat.
Nibilum is a problem which concerns the fundamental quality of all existing 
things. That all beings show their fundamental “illusion” aspect, means pre­
cisely their “nihilization.” All things return to nibilum without leaving a trace. 
From olden times people have spoken of the transiency of things. Indeed, a 
nibilum which does not even permit “things” to leave any traces, lies from the 
outset at the base of all things. That is the meaning of transiency.
But as I have said in a previous chapter, to nibilum, as lying at the base of 
existence, remains attached the feature of being considered as something 
besides existence, and thus finally from the standpoint of existence. It is a 
nothingness represented from the side of being, a nothingness in opposition 
to being, a relative nothingness. Therein appears the necessity furthermore of 
making nibilum convert into “emptiness” (fanyata).
This emptiness is not an emptiness represented as something besides 
being, apart from being. It is not simply an “empty nothing” (ktimu 
It is an absolute emptiness which has emptied also these kinds of represented 
emptiness. Moreover, and for that reason, it is from the beginning at one with 
being. Being also is from the beginning one with emptiness. At the root of being, 
where being appears as originally one with emptiness, in the home-ground of 
being, emptiness appears as originally at one with being.
When we speak of the root of being, this should not be imagined as existing 
somewhere far behind the things which we see with our eyes and think of with 
our minds. Rather, it is extremely near, within the reach, so to speak, of things 
themselves. And the “thing”-itself at the base of the thing itself, the thing 
in its suchness, is one with emptiness. Where a thing comes into existence, 
there the field of emptiness too lies opened up.
However, we usually represent things as objects on the fields of the senses 
and of reason; i.e. we put them at a distance from ourselves. And this distance 
means that we are drawn to things and that we draw things to us. In this sense 
we can speak of “will” or desire and attachment at the base of “representation.” 
As long as we stand in such a relation to things, we imagine that “things” are 
forever far from us and out of reach; and that we cannot even know the 
“things”-themselves.
That “being” appears from the first at one with emptiness, or that in the
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field of emptiness every being comes into its own and reveals itself in its in- 
itself mode of being—means that all these beings, which in nihilum showed an 
image of dispersion and dissolution, are once more restored to “being”; that 
all beings are again returned to the concentrating force which gathers them 
inside themselves, to the possibility of existence; or again, that they are re­
turned each to its own “pir/ur” Qoku f&J, to the individual capacity which each 
of them possesses as a manifestation of that possibility of existence. The pine 
returns to its pine-wr/w, the bamboo to its bamboo-wrrw, man to his own 
human pirtus.
In that sense, and in contradistinction with nihilum, which is the field of 
nihilization (Nicbtung), emptiness could be called the field of “be-ification” 
Qcbtung}. This field of be-ification is, to speak in Nietzschean terms, the field 
of the great affirmation, where we can say “yes” to all things. (We shall come 
back to this later.)
That all beings are restored to “being” means that all beings appear again 
as possessing substance. The substance of things which appear on the field 
of reason dissipate, so to speak, in a bottomless abyss, on the field of nihilum. 
The essential forms of things are dissolved in the nihilum whereon nothing leaves 
a trace. The question of what things are—and, most of all, what I myself am— 
does not find an answer any more. Man ordinarily grasps himself on the field 
of reason as a rational being. But on the field of nihilum, man becomes unable to 
express “what” this himself is. The self and things both turn into a big 
question mark.
On the field of emptiness all things appear again as substanoes, each pos­
sessing its own individual self-hood fjisbd 1=31±), though of course, not in the 
same sense as on the field of reason. The “tunnel of nihilum” which has been 
gone through, accounts for an essential difference; the difference between what 
is grasped as the selfhess of the “thing” on the field of reason and the selfness 
of the thing as it is on its own home-ground.
On the field of reason the in-itselfof a thing is expressed by: “It is this thing 
or that thing, it exists as this thing or as that thing.” For example, “This is 
a human being, he is there as a human being.” Here the concept of substance is 
connoted in the thinking process. On this occasion, some philosophers will 
consider as substance the universal form, “human being,” and others the“this- 
here” of the individual man.
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On the field of emptiness, however, the in-itself of a thing cannot be 
expressed simply as “being this thing or that thing.” Here it is revealed 
precisely as something which cannot find its expression in that way. We can 
say in general that the selfness now manifests itself as that which cannot be 
expressed in the language of reason, in a language with a logical form; or as 
that which, if one wants to put it into words anyway, can only be expressed in 
the form of a paradox, such as, “It is not this thing or that thing, therefore it is 
this thing or that thing.”
Being is only being if it is one with emptiness. It is only on the field of empti­
ness that beings are on their own home-ground, that they are truly as they are, 
abiding in their own selfness. One may say that the thing appears again as 
substantial, but this substantiality does not consist in its logical self-identity, 
but only paradoxically, in its self-identity with emptiness. It is an absolutely 
unsubstantial substantiality. If one wants to use the language of reason, the 
concepts of our intellectual thinking (to which substance belongs), one has to 
express the thing-itself as we did. That is to say, it is essentially inexpressible 
in words.
The “what” of a thing is a real “what” only there where it is absolutely no 
“what” whatsoever. The form of a thing is truly form only at one with absolute 
formlessness. For example, the form “human being” of “this is a human being” 
originates where it sheds all forms. Within every human being there is opened 
up a field of absolute formlessness, a field of non-determinability as “human 
being” or some other “what.” The fact that man reveals himself as man 
from such a field constitutes precisely the most original meaning of his existence 
as man.
n
That being is only being at one with emptiness is said, in its fullest meaning, 
in regard to the idea of the substance of “things.” I was referring to that view­
point when I said above that the mode of being of things as in-themselves is 
not substance but something that may be called unsubstantial substance.
As I said before,1 the ancients expressed the selfness of things in expressions
1 The Eastern Buddhist, Vol. V, no. 2, p. 103.
74
THE STANDPOINT OF SUNYATX
like: “Fire does not bum fire,” “A sword does not cut a sword,” “The eye 
does not see the eye.” Fire does not bum itself in its actual burning activity. 
In the very fact that fire preserves itself in the midst of its burning there is 
non-burning. Burning is non-burning and non-burning is burning. Precisely 
that paradox expresses the itself-ness whereby the fire in the process of burning 
is on its own home-ground.
However, such remarks cannot only be made about the idea of substance, 
but equally about all the various “attributes” of things. When one says, for 
example, that fire is hot, there is reason to say that the heat itself is not hot. 
Of course, this does not mean that, apart from the reality, “hot,” there would 
be another and distinct reality, “not-hot.” And when we say “not-hot” we are 
not pointing to a fact, e.g., a temperature some degrees below zero. When 
something is hot, and no matter to what a high degree it is hot, there is “no 
heat” in perfect unity with the very fact that the heat is there.
The “no” of that “no heat” is not a nothing relative to the being of “there 
is heat.” It is a nothingness completely beyond the sphere of the relativity of 
being and nothingness. It is a non-heat spoken of on a completely different 
field, which transcends completely the field where the distinction between 
hot and cold and the opposition (as contrariness) of heat and cold obtain, 
and which means the absolute negation of that discriminative field.
When it comes to the fact of “being cold,” this field of non-heat is the field 
of non-cold. The distinction between hot and cold lies in the field of the sense 
perceptions. Our everyday judgments implied in perception and in concepts, 
and also our scientific and philosophical conceptions are based on this field. 
The field of non-heat and non-cold is a completely different field, the absolute 
negation of all those standpoints, the field of absolute nothingness.
Thus non-heat signifies nothing else than the original reality of heat. Heat 
and non-heat are self-identically one reality. Only in self-identity with that 
field of non-heat (and non-cold) can the fact of heat arise and the field of that 
fact even exist. This non-heat is nothing other than an expression of the fact 
that the reality of heat comes into its own and reveals itself on a field of absolute 
nothingness, which transcends both the realm of the senses and that of reason. 
It points to the place where the reality of heat realizes itself, as it were, in dear 
relief.
That fire is hot is a datum of the senses and, ontologically, belongs to the
75
THE EASTERN BUDDHIST
category of “quality.” One can also say that heat, as something measurable 
by a thermometer, belongs to the category of “quantity.” But the feet of heat, 
where it comes into its own, is an original fact which cannot be captured by the 
categories of quality and quantity. That the hotness of fire is “not hot” does 
not signify the quality of hot and cold; this non-heat is a non-heat which cannot 
be measured by a thermometer. In short, it means that the fact of heat comes 
into its own and reveals itself in the clear-cut relief of is-ness as an original 
reality on the yonder side (or on the hither side) of the categories of quality 
and quantity.
Of course, when I say that hotness as such is not hot, I do not mean that the 
concept of “heat” is not hot. I am calling into question, on a field which tran­
scends also the realm of reason where concepts are at home, a fact that reveals 
itself in its suchness as a reality. If one considered the transcendent character 
alone, a realm of Ideas such as Plato was thinking of might come near to what 
I mean. If something like the “Idea” of heat can be conceived of, it would 
be something beyond the heat of the senses, something that is not hot. How­
ever, if one considers the transcendent non-heat as some “thing” called 
the Idea “heat,” if one conceives of a world of Ideas as of true realities apart 
from the sensory world, one still remains on the standpoint of contemplating 
reason. The transcendent non-heat should be self-identical with the reality 
of heat.
The field of non-heat is not a world apart, an “intelligible world” of Ideas, 
but should be, as the field of absolute nothingness, at one with the world of 
original reality. But, on the other hand, the world of original reality is not 
simply the “sensory world.” The original reality as self-identity of non-heat 
and heat is neither the heat of the senses nor heat as an Idea. This reality per­
vades, as it were, both the realm of the senses and that of reason, but does not, 
as such, belong to cither of them. Of course, from a standpoint where one 
would cut “heat” off from all else and experience it exclusively, heat would 
be a sense datum. If we set non-heat apart and think solely of it alone, then 
that would be something like the Idea of heat. However, the reality of heat 
itself is neither of them.
There is only one “world” of that original reality. There are not two worlds, 
a sensory one and a super-sensory one, or—in the line of Kant—a world of 
phenomena and a world of “things-in-themselves” as noumena. We usually 
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consider as world the environment-world which spreads out around us and is 
the field of our behaviour. And it happens that, going on from there, we 
imagine an invisible world in the background of the first one and apart from 
it. But neither of them is the world in its suchness. Neither of them is the 
world wherein we really live. For us to consider our environment as a world 
and imagine a super-sensory world is made possible only by the fact that we 
are actually living in the world of original reality. So much for the “heat” 
of a hot “thing.”
To sum up, a “hot” thing comes into its own and reveals itself as a hot 
thing, beyond all categories of substance, quality, quantity, etc., on the field 
of emptiness, viz. the field of absolute nothingness. Here a “thing” is master 
of itself. This could be called the autonomous mode of being of things. “Auto­
nomous” is not the mode of being the revelation of which is directed at us, the 
“front-side” of things; their surface so to speak, or things turning their “face” 
to us. It points to the mode of being of things which has nothing to do with 
our representations or judgments.
However, we cannot call that the backside or the hidden aspect of things. 
For such expressions imply already a looking at things from our viewpoint. 
“Things” on their own home-ground have no front or backsides; they are 
purely and simply themselves, they are exclusively in-themselves.
Of course, when we call such a mode of being autonomous or self-relying, we 
are not thinking of “subjectivity” in the sense that this refers to a self- 
conscious “ego.” We are not thinking things anthropomorphically. Insofar as 
things can be called “in-themselves,” they possess a characteristic which 
brings them in the orbit of the concept of substance; insofar as a thing can be 
called “autonomous,” it contains a quality which relates it to the concept of 
subject. But it is neither substance nor subject.
We have to attribute to it a completely different concept of existence, one 
which up to now has not occurred to people in their daily lives, and which even 
philosophers in their ontology have not considered. The haiku poet Basho, 
however, seems to hint at it when he says: “Learn about the pine tree from 
the pine tree. Learn about the bamboo from the bamboo.”
This does not simply mean “observe the pine tree carefully.” Still less does 
it mean “study the pine tree scientifically.” It means get yourself into the 
mode of being where the pine tree is the pine tree itself and the bamboo is 
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the bamboo itself, and there look at the pine tree, there look at the bamboo. 
It requests you to go and enter into the dimension where they come into their 
own and reveal themselves in their suchness, to allow yourself to accord with 
the pine tree’s “self” or the bamboo’s “self.” The Japanese word for learn 
(narau) means precisely: to make efforts to stand essentially in the same mode 
of being as the thing you want to learn about. What renders this possible is 
the field of emptiness.
The in-itself mode of being of things means that things stand on themselves 
and are settled in their own position; that they are centering in themselves 
and are not scattering. From olden times, men have called samadhi (jo 5^) 
the mental state wherein man gathers his own mind in himself, thereby goes 
as it were one step beyond the sphere of his ordinary conscious and self- 
conscious mind and, in that sense, forgets his own ego. This word thus refers 
in the first place to a mental state, but it would also apply to the in-itself mode 
of being whereby a “thing” is settled in its own position. In such a sense one 
could call that in-itself mode of being : M/mw&i-being. That things are in their 
own home-ground is, as it were, their reality as in a state of samadhi. So to in­
dicate the fact that a fire is burning we could say that the fire is in the midst 
of its fae-samadhi.
Of course this is not different and apart from the fact that a thing is a deter­
mined (definite) thing; that it is this specific thing and nothing else. Only, 
the place where a thing is itself is ordinarily defined from the outside of the 
thing itself. For example, on the standpoint of reason this is expressed as a 
“form,” in a “definition.” Or one may think that this peculiar individual 
originates as a union of form and matter, in which matter works as the so- 
called principle of individuation.
In either case, it is a way of looking at the thing from the outside. In con­
trast with these views, the selfness of the thing away from such outside views 
and in its direct and simple determination, could be expressed as wwdfo-being 
in the above sense, that is, a mode of its being settled in its own original posi­
tion, in natural quietude determined as itself.
In such a mode of being, the fact that a thing is establishes itself with the signi­
ficance of an absolute fact. Even a fact like “it is hot,” which now arises and 
soon disappears, is absolute as a fact; as absolute as if it were the only fact in 
heaven and earth. In that sense it has been said of a period of hot weather: “It 
78
THE STANDPOINT OF SuNYATA
is hot over all heaven and earth.” It is a “bottomless” heat (not, of course, in 
the sense of thermometer degrees).
The expression: “A single falling leaf betokens autumn” is not only a poeti­
cal figure of speech. It is a word that is spoken out on the field where the fall 
of one leaf is considered as an absolute fact: in it the wwd^i-appearance of 
the falling leaf is felt and touched. One could say that poetical truth, and true 
poetry too, involves the expressing of facts on that field.
m
That being is only being at one with emptiness means that being has fun­
damentally an “unreal” character, that all beings are essentially provisional 
phenomena; but also that their being is more truly real than what is usually 
expressed as the reality or the realness of things (e.g. their substance). It signifies 
namely the fundamental mode of being of the “thing” on its own home-ground, 
and that this is the thing itself as it is.
Therefore, this original mode of being is an unreal phenomenon. The thing- 
itself is as such the appearance. Consequently, when we speak of an unreal 
phenomenon, we do not mean that behind it there exists a real being, which 
appears in illusory shapes. Precisely because it is appearance without any 
appearing “being,” this “appearance” is fundamentally illusory in its reality 
itself, and reality in its illusion itself.
In my opinion, this can be expressed by the term “middle” (cbu +) of the 
ancients, because the in-itself mode of being of things is appropriately charac­
terized by that term. As I said before, the various “shapes” which things show 
on the field of the senses (the various sense-determined modes), as well as 
the various “shapes” which things show on the field of reason (whether con­
sidered as forms of things or as categories in the sense of “forms” of under­
standing) are all aspects of things insofar as they appear to us and are only 
modes of things in that respect, the “front” of things.
They are nothing but shapes of things, projected on the screen of a relation­
ship to us. They do not show the mode of being whereby “things” arc on their 
own home-ground; they are aspects of things insofar as these things are re­
moved from their own home-ground and are projected into our “conscious­
ness,” into our senses and our intellect. These shapes are, so to speak, radiations 
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from the thing-itself, like light rays issuing from a source of light. Or, to use 
another metaphor, they are aspects of things appearing on the circumference. 
That is, we are usually seeing the in-itself of things from their circumference, 
while skirting the outside of things. There things do not display their own 
being-in-itself.
The “thing”-in-itself cannot be revealed to us, except when we leap from the 
circumference to the center, into that in-itself. This “leap” is the opening up 
in ourselves of the field of emptiness as the absolute this-side and is thus more 
intimately this-side than our own selves. That “center” is where the being of 
things originates as a being at one with emptiness; the place where things 
posit themselves, affirm themselves; the place where things are in their 
“position.”
There things are settled in their position, are within their “settled-being” 
(wm^i-being). Over against this, the shapes of things appearing on the fields 
of the senses and of reason are nothing more than a mere negative of the thing- 
itself. Even the substance is nothing more than that. These shapes are a nega­
tion of the “position” (positing itself) of a thing, transferring it into a mere 
projection; they are a removal of a thing from its position to a different place.
This is also the reason why the later Schelling characterized all philosophy 
of reason up to Hegel as negative philosophy, and designated his own a posi­
tive philosophy. (The content of what I am saying here is, of course, com­
pletely different from Schelling’s philosophy.)
Be this as it may, in a center different from their circumference, things are 
positing themselves as they are and in such a way as not to permit any approach 
from the outside. Above I have called such an in-itself mode of being “the 
middle.” There is a saying: “If you try to explain something by comparing it 
with anything whatsoever, you fail to hit the middle.”2 This expression can be 
used also in connection with the thing-itself. For example, if, on the stand­
point of reason, one conceives of the in-itself being of a thing as a substance 
and explains “what” this thing substantially is, one will not find thereby the 
thing-itself, only a form “comparable to” the thing-itself. One has already 
missed the thing-itself when one even thinks to determine it as “this thing” 
2 Nangaku Ejo’s answer to the Sixth Patriarch’s question: “What is it that thus 
comes?”
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or “that thing” by thought. The thing itself goes on positing itself as it is; it 
goes on being in its own “middle,” where it is shapeless shape, formless form.
Looking at it from the circumference, the various shapes of a “thing” do 
not fit its in-itself. However, looking back from the in-itself, i.e. from the 
center, the “middle” mode of being pervades all shapes. In a word, all sensory 
modes and all super-sensory forms of a thing are not apart from the “position” 
(the positing-itself mode of being) of the thing. They are all self-revelation of 
the thing-itself, its self revelation even then in the mode of being shapeless 
shape, formless form, in the mode of being “the middle.”
When an ancient philosopher stated,3 “All things are in attainment of them­
selves,” he pointed, one could say, to such a mode of being. There, the visible 
appearances of a thing too are the self-possessing form of the thing, its self­
affirming form. And the place where all things are acquiring themselves is 
precisely the field of emptiness, the field that opens up as absolutely this-side, 
beyond the standpoint of senses and reason, behind the tunnel of nihilum.
3 Ch’eng Hao, one of the founders of Sung Neo-Confucianism.
On that field of emptiness, each thing comes into its own and reveals itself 
in a self-affirmation, each in its own possibility and virtus of being, each in its 
own shape. The conversion to and entrance into that field means, for us men, 
the fundamental affirmation of the being of all things (of the world), and at 
the same time, of our own existence. The field of emptiness is nothing but 
the field of the great affirmation.
IV
Parallel to the concept of substance, developed in regard to “things,” the 
concept of subject has been used in the history of thought particularly in 
regard to our human existence. “Substance” expresses something existing at 
the base of the various attributes; it expresses the mode of being whereby 
a thing exists as itself. Similarly, “subject” expresses something which exists, 
in a human being, at the basis of his various faculties as their unifying factor, 
the mode of being whereby a human being appears as himself
However, does this concept of subject after all truly express man in him­
self as he is on his own home-ground? Is not it rather true that this concept,
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just like its parallel, substance, merely signifies man in himself insofar as he 
appears to himself within himself, in the sphere of his own consciousness?
Of course, it is almost universally taken for granted that the concept of sub­
ject expresses the essence of human existence. This is particularly the case in 
modem times, because in modem times human existence has essentially 
become self-conscious.
The self-interpretation of modem man can already be seen in Descartes and 
the cogito as the fundamental principle of his philosophy, and it manifests itself 
most deeply in Kant who radicalized the same direction. In both his theoreti­
cal and his practical philosophy, Kant probes deeply into the standpoint of 
the subject. In his theoretical philosophy, this is shown by what he himself 
called the “Copernican Revolution.” Cognition of an object, namely ex­
perience, is not effected by our sensations and concepts concerning that object 
modelling themselves after that object, but on the contrary, through the fact 
that the object fits in the a priori characteristics of our faculty of sense percep­
tion and in the a priori concepts of our understanding.
By thus looking for the basis of cognition in exactly the opposite direction 
of the entire tradition before him, Kant opened his critical standpoint halfway 
between the former metaphysics, which tried to grasp the thing-itself dog­
matically by purely rational thinking, and Humean scepticism, which shook 
this metaphysics severely—down to its very roots. It is generally known, 
however, that he arrived hereby at the theses that the range of possibility of 
our knowledge is limited to the phenomenal world, the thing-in-itself lying 
beyond the phenomena as what is actual reality by itself alone, but cannot be 
known by us.
At any rate, nature as the totality of all objects of experience, or the world 
of phenomena, appears clearly as constructed by the a priori forms of our senses 
and our understanding. And in this self-awareness of man as the bearer of such 
powers is clearly recognizable the self-awareness of modem man as “subject.”
One can say that here the subject, which lies at the basis of all faculties of 
consciousness, appears as lying, at the same time—through the a priori forms of 
its various faculties—at the ground of the visible world and all things therein. 
We can see this especially in Kant’s concept of “transcendental apperception 
of self-consciousness,” in which the link with Cartesian cogito is also to be per­
ceived.
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In Kant’s case, however, this self-awareness has two aspects. On the one
investigation of what is various faculties of man’s con- 
sdousness involves a deep penetration into the existence of the object and a 
a subject has reached its extreme point. But, on the other hand, precisely 
this radical awareness of the powers of man entails an awareness of the limits 
of these powers which appears in the sharp distinction between the phenomenal 
world and the world of things-in-themselves.
The concept of the thing-in-itself that called forth the distinction between 
these two worlds is full of difficult problems and has evoked attempts to over­
come them. Beginning with Fichte, German Idealism tried to step over, be­
yond this distinction, to the standpoint of metaphysical reason, and produced 
finally Hegel’s philosophy of absolute reason. This philosophy induced a total 
turnabout to Kierkegaard’s standpoint of radical subjectivity and “existence,” 
to the historical materialism of Marx and to the active nihilism and “the will 
to power” of Nietzsche; a development which reaches to the present day.
But if we try to go back along the line of these thought fluctuations and 
consider more fundamentally in which point of the Kantian philosophy, in 
the final analysis, the problem has its roots, one point soon draws our attention. 
Namely, Kant sees “things” right from the beginning as objects; or, to put it 
the other way around, Kant stands on the standpoint of representation. In his 
theoretical philosophy, the objective representational viewpoint is always 
presupposed as the base.
The problem of the thing-in-itself developed, in feet, from that basic presup­
position. To view things as objects is after all to grasp things on the field of 
consciousness, insofar as they turn to us and appear to us. In that case, of 
course, all objects are taken as representations. From that direction, that is, 
when pursuing that mode of being of things, the concept of substance as I 
explained it above arises too.
In the old metaphysics, one thinks that the substance, grasped by reason, 
signifies the objective “being” of the thing-itself. But even then, from the 
moment a “thing” is taken as an object and is seen as “outside” the subject, 
it is in fact already represented by the subject as an “outside” thing. The 
fact that the concept of “substance” is established as the “being” of the thing- 
itself entails as its necessary reverse that one has the standpoint of represen­
tation as one’s basis.
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The old metaphysics did not delve deeply into that paradox. It believed 
uncritically in the power of reason and thought that the “being’’ of the thing- 
itself can be grasped by the activity of reason. It considered that knowledge 
consists in the perfect “correspondence” (adequation between a concept and 
a “thing.” The paradox that, when a thing-in-itself  is posited objectively “out­
side” the subject, this means that in fact it is represented as such by the sub­
ject—and the dialectics contained therein—are covered up and hidden by the 
one-dimensional relationship of “correspondence” between thing and concept. 
However, when the hidden basis of that metaphysics was laid bare by Hume 
and the simple belief in reason had crumbled, it was only natural that the said 
paradox became an object of reflection and that Kant’s standpoint of self­
examination of reason appeared.
As a result, one accepted the idea that all objects are representations and, 
on that basis, one interpreted the substance as not revealing the “being” of 
the thing in itself, but as one a priori concept (category) of pure reason (in this 
case, pure understanding), as something which the subject “thinks into” 
(bineindenken) the thing. In other words, the substance became an element in 
the construction of things insofar as they appear. And at the same time there 
came into being a sharp distinction between the phenomenal world and the 
world of things-in-themselves.
In short, in the old metaphysics the concept of substance, as revealing the 
being of the thing-itself, constituted the center of ontology. Now, on the con­
trary, as a result of the clarification of the real situation underlying its origin, 
this concept of substance turned into a “form” of pure understanding, a norm 
of its cognitive activity. And the standpoint of the subject and its self­
consciousness emerged as the center of the system of the critique of knowl­
edge which replaced the former ontology.
However, what I have tried to say in this all too crude outline is that the old 
metaphysics and Kant’s critical philosophy do not differ fundamentally at all 
in that the standpoint of the object and its representation is taken as basis and 
presupposition. The evolution is only that the object-representation relation, 
which formerly was the hidden foundation, in the latter is brought to light and 
has become the acknowledged foundation.
The old metaphysics thought in the general direction that our representa­
tions fashion themselves after the object, and it considered, therefore, that 
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the concept expressing “what a thing is” (in other words, the substance 
concept), can adequately match the object as thing in itself. Kant, on the other 
hand, discovered the opposite direction: objects fashion themselves after our 
representation. Therefore, the object of our knowledge is not the thing-in- 
itself, and “substance” becomes one “form” of the understanding which con­
strues the object insofar as it appears to us.
Of course, the difference in direction of these two standpoints is not simply 
a case of opposite directions on the same plane. As I said before, Kant’s stand­
point that the object follows our representation implicitly underlies the 
standpoint of the old metaphysics, according to which our representations 
follow the object. In Kant this hidden presence is brought to light. If we inter­
preted this as an opposite direction on the same plane, we would identify Kant’s 
transcendental criticism with Berkeley’s idealism.
However, in spite of all this, or rather because of it, we can say that the same 
objective-representative viewpoint is fundamental to both conceptions as 
a common presupposition. Kant’s revolution of thought, which turned the 
standpoint of the old metaphysics upside down, is, more basically, seen still 
dependent on the same presupposition, precisely by virtue of the fact that it 
is only the reversal of the old metaphysics.
The concept of “substance,” the central idea of the old metaphysics, and 
the concept of “subject,” the core of Kant’s philosophy, have the same found­
ation. On the strength of that foundation, what he himself called his “Coper­
nican Revolution” brought about the awakening of the subject to its rights 
over against the world as the encompassing totality of objects of experience. 
In that sense, Kant’s theoretical philosophy, as well as his practical philosophy 
(to which we shall come later), reveals profoundly the essential mode of 
being of modern man.
After Kant, the subject standpoint of modem man ran its precipitous course 
up to the very end. Soon it reached the standpoint of reason, of absolute reason, 
and further, breaking through even that standpoint, laid bare the nibilum at 
its own root.
It is permitted to say that the standpoint of the subject manifested its real 
roots only when it advanced to its ecstatic self-transcendence into the field of 
nibilum. This means also that at the same time the nibilum is discovered at 
the roots of the existence of things.
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For Kant, knowledge of nature by reason is possible only if reason follows 
what reason itself a priori thinks into Qnnnndenktn) nature. In the same way, we 
could say that the mbilum which reveals itself at the ground roots of the sub­
ject when it breaks through the field of reason is at the same time “inserted 
into” (bintinlegen) the bottom of “things” as a totality.
However, when the concept of substance, which was supposed to express 
the in-itself of things, and the concept of subject, which was supposed to ex­
press the in-itself of the self, collide at their roots with nibilum and are negated 
on the spot, they make a leap forward into the field where “thing” and the self 
(which they tried to grasp) come into their own and reveal their in-itself. This 
means that, on the field of nibilum, “things” and the seifare not objects of cog­
nition, and cannot be grasped or expressed conceptually (as logoi). They are no 
longer determined as substance or subject, and appear indefinable as “this” or 
“that.”
Therefore, when we say that the nibilum which opens up at the bottom of 
the subject is already inserted into the bottom of things, this cannot be con­
ceived in the same way as when, in the case of object-knowledge, it is said that 
reason inserts or thinks its own principles into nature. On the contrary, that 
nibilum is inserted into the bottom of things means, in fact, that from the 
bottom of all existing things nibilum looms up, leaps at us, and inserts itself into 
the roots of our existence. Then, the existence of things and the existence of 
the self both turn into something utterly ungraspable and indefinable, and 
appear as “Doubt” in the quality of great reality, of which I treated above.4
4 The Eastern Buddhist, Vol. V, no. 2, p. 98.
Herein, this standpoint of nibilum shows a fundamental point of difference 
with all forms of scepticism up to the present (for example Hume’s scepticism). 
In scepticism we doubt a certain matter; on the standpoint ofw^i/wm, all things 
and we ourselves become together a real doubt. And this, in turn, means 
coming a step nearer to the true self-realization of the real itself-ness of “things” 
and of the self; or rather, coming a step nearer to the field where their in- 
itself is originally and from the beginning realized, to the field of emptiness as 
the absolute this-side.
On the field of nibilum, where the field of reason is broken through, cognition 
is not the question. Here “things” and the self are no longer objects of cogni­
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tion. The field of nihilum is precisely the appearance of the realization that 
things-themselves and the self-itself are utterly ungraspable by cognition. On 
the field of nihilum, objects (“things” and the self as objects) and their cogni­
tion cease to be the question; the question is already about the reality of things 
and of the self.
Now, their reality and the understanding thereof is possible, not by going 
back from the field of nibilum to the field of reason, but only by going on from 
the field of nihilum to arrive at the field where things and the self originally and 
really realize and manifest themselves; in other words, it is only possible by 
their realization.
The field of nibilum appears when one breaks out of the field of consciousness 
and reason, and advances a step further in the direction of such a field, the field 
of emptiness.
In the above, I have touched from time to time on the conversion from the 
standpoint of nibilum to the standpoint of emptiness. Therefore, we shall not 
enter into this discussion now.
The standpoint of nibilum is not, of course, a beyond in the sense that is 
usual when one thinks of God or of the world of Ideas. All the same, it tran­
scends the standpoint of our everyday understanding of the “being” of things 
and of the self—the standpoint which straddles sensibility and reason. In that 
sense, it is not simply a this-world standpoint: it transcends this-world but in 
the direction of a more intimately this-side position than our everyday this- 
side.
However, nibilum still stands over against being; it is posited alone, by it­
self, “outside of” being. It is still considered as a nihilum- ‘thing.” It is not an 
object of consciousness but still shows a remainder of objective consideration; 
it is not the standpoint of consciousness, but, nevertheless, has not completely 
relinquished all representational consideration of nihilum as nihilum. In a word, 
nihilum is still, to a certain degree, seen as a beyond; or, conversely, it still 
clings to the standpoint of the this-side looking at the beyond. It has essen­
tially a transitional character.
Nibilum is the absolute negation of all “being,” and is, therefore, relative to 
being. The essence of nibilum lies in a merely negative (denying) negativity. 
This standpoint contains the self-contradiction that it can neither remain in 
being nor get away from being. It is a standpoint divided in itself.
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Therein lies its transitional character. We call it the standpoint of nibilum 
but, in fact, it is not a point whereon we can really stand. It is nothing more 
than a spot we have to “run across quickly.”5 In its essential transitionality, in 
its negative negativity as such, it is radically real and actual, but the stand­
point itself of nibilum is essentially void. Only in such a capacity is this stand­
point the standpoint of nibilum. The standpoint of emptiness is a completely 
different position. This is not a standpoint of merely negative negativity, not 
an essentially transitional standpoint. It is the standpoint where, in the sense 
explained above, absolute negation is at the same time a great affirmation. It 
is not a standpoint which only states that the self and things are empty. If so, 
it would not be different from the position wherein at the basis of “things” 
and of the self nibilum opens up.
The basis of the standpoint of emptiness is: rather than the self being empty, 
emptiness is self; rather than “things” being empty, emptiness is “things.” 
Only in this conversion do we transcend the standpoint where nibilum is seen 
as the beyond of being; only in this dimension does the standpoint appear 
where we stand not merely “in” the beyond facing it, but in the beyond 
having reached it. Only on this standpoint do we really transcend the stand­
point (still hidden at the back of the field of nibilum) of a this-side looking at 
the beyond. Such a “reached beyond”6 is the realization of the beyond, and is 
an absolute conversion not only from the mere this-side—which is a matter of 
course—but also from a this-side looking at the beyond. The “reached beyond” 
is nothing else but absolute this-side.
On the field of emptiness, the actual being of things is not “phenomenon” in 
the Kantian sense, namely, the mode of being of things insofar as they appear 
to us. It is the mode of being as reality-in-itself, wherein “things” are really 
on their own home-ground. This, however, is not the Kantian Ding an sicb 
either, namely, that mode of being of things sharply distinguished from“phe- 
nomenon” and forever agnostic to us. It is the authentic thing-itself, which in 
fact actually exists. Here, we know no distinction of thing-in-itself and its 
appearance. The authentic “thing” is the “thing”-itself as it appears, without 
front or back.
5 From a saying of the Chinese Zen master J6shu: “Don’t remain where the Buddha 
is; run across quickly where the Buddha is not.”
6 A Buddhist term: to reach the yonder shore (of the sea of Life and Death).
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However, this is not the “thing” in the sense of objective “reality,” such 
as all kinds of realism have come to conceive it on the field of the senses or on 
the field of reason. Instead, things are all illusory in their true itself-ness as 
such. I have explained above how a dogmatical standpoint, which simply con­
siders the so-called “outer” objective reality to be the thing-itself, hides a self- 
contradiction behind its back and how, from there, Kant5s critical philosophy 
and the split into two completely irreconcilable modes of being, “phenomenon” 
and “Ding an rich” were called into being. The standpoint of emptiness is a 
standpoint where these two irreconcilable modes of being, precisely at the 
point where both are radicalized, originate as one and the same mode of being 
of the thing.
On the one hand, the thing-itself is, on this field, truly the “thing”-itself 
because here, in contrast with what is called objective reality, it is freed from 
all hidden links with a subject. However, this does not mean that it is utterly 
agnostic. With respect to reason it is, indeed, agnostic, but its realization can 
be obtained by our turning to and entering into the field of emptiness, where 
the thing-itself realizes itself.
On the other hand, on this field, the being of a thing, as being at one with 
emptiness, is radically unreal. It is not, however, semblance in the sense 
wherein dogmatism uses the word : what is no objective reality. It is not 
“phenomenon” either, apart from which (as in critical philosophy) a thing-in- 
itself would exist. Things are truly unreal in the precise point where they 
are truly things-themselves.
As the saying goes, “A bird flies and it is like a bird; a fish moves and it 
seems to be a fish.” The in-itself of the flying bird is “like a bird,” the 
moving fish-itself is “resembling a fish.” Or conversely, the “like” (gotosbi io} 
of the bird is no other than “like true reality” (suchness, nyojitsu io JQ. Speaking 
about this mode of being, wherein a thing is on its own home-ground, I have 
used expressions like “being in the middle” or “being in its own position”; 
I have also called it “wm^i-being.”
On this field of emptiness, the standpoint of subjective self-consciousness 
of modem man, which was opened up by Kant’s Copernican Revolution, has 
to be revolutionized again. The relationship in knowledge whereby the object 
has to follow the a priori behaviour of our perception and thought, has to be 
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turned upside down once more, so that again it appears that, in a sense, the self 
follows and fashions itself after “things.”
However, since this field transcends both the fields of sense perception and 
of rational thinking, this does not mean, as in sensual realism or in dogmatic 
metaphysics, that the subject turns to the object and accords with it. It means 
the realization (manifestation and coming to itself-comprehension) of the 
“thing”-itself, which cannot be grasped by senses or by reason. This is not 
cognition of an object, but non-cognitive knowing of a non-objective thing- 
itself, a knowing in unknowing, a kind of docta ignorantia.
Since this is a field where the subject too in its usual sense (the self, es­
tablished over against an object) is negated and transcended in the direction 
of its absolute this-side, we cannot say, “the self knows.” We cannot say, 
“I know,” and, thus, we cannot say, “I know” either. Strictly speaking, it is no 
longer satisfactory to speak, as I did above borrowing Kant’s expression, about 
the self “following” or “taking its direction” (sicb ricbten) from things; in other 
words, we cannot even say that the self, taking things as its standard, straight­
ens itself out in the direction of “things.”
To speak about a directing thing and a directed thing, to speak about a di­
rection, belongs to the standpoint of cognitive knowledge- Only if we transcend 
all that are we entitled to speak about knowing of unknowing. The thing- 
itself, when we try to direct ourselves to it, immediately turns into an object, 
and its knowledge (knowledge of no-knowledge) immediately turns into 
cognition.
The thing-itself originally realizes itself as it is, in its own “middle” which 
can never be objectified; and its non-objective knowledge, the knowledge of 
no-knowledge, means that we convert and enter into the “middle” of the thing 
itself. It means that we straighten ourselves out, turning to where none of our 
turnings obtains, in the direction of what negates all our directions.
A single stone, even a blade of grass, requires this from us. The pine demands 
that we “learn to be” a pine, the bamboo demands that we “accord with” 
bamboo. Escaping our ordinary self-centered mode of being, where we are 
captured by our self while grasping our self, and comprehending things in 
the point where things obtain themselves—that is to convert and enter into 
the “middle” of things themselves. (Of course, “middle” does not mean here 
an “inside” over against an outside. I stressed this point in the above.)
SB*
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From olden times, the cognitive power of reason has been called “the natural 
light.” However, the real “natural light” is not the light of reason. It is, rather, 
if I may so designate it, the light of all “things.” What we called the knowledge 
of no-knowledge is, as it were, the focusing, the concentration into one point, 
of the light of all things. Or, better still, it is converting and entering into the 
place where all things-in-themselves are gathered into one.
As all this is the opposite of the ordinary way of thinking, it may sound 
strange. But, to make its meaning clear, we shall have to go deeper into the 
question and examine again some expressions which I have used above: first, 
“Being is only being at one with emptiness,” second, “emptiness is self.” In 
the following, with the help of a comparison, I hope to throw some light on 
the meaning of these expressions.
(To be continued)
Translated by Jan van Bragt and Yamamoto Seisaku
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